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How VSX OpenPGP/i protects the files you exchange

Your payroll file goes to the bank tonight. The bank's acknowledgement comes back in the morning. In between, the files sit on servers, travel over networks, and pass through people's hands. OpenPGP is the format most banks, processors and partners use to make sure that, along the way, nobody can read those files and nobody can change them unnoticed. VSX OpenPGP/i speaks it on IBM i. This page explains what it does, in plain terms, and where its limits are.

Padlocks and a signet ring

OpenPGP works with pairs of keys. The easiest way to picture them:

  • Each partner hands out open padlocks. Anyone can snap one shut on a box, but only the partner has the key that opens it. When you send the bank a file, it goes into a box locked with the bank's padlock. Once it's shut, not even you can open it again. Only the bank can.
  • You have a signet ring. Pressing it into wax on the box tells the bank the box came from you, and that nobody has opened and resealed it since. The bank checks the seal against the impression of your ring you gave them earlier.

Your partners have rings too, and you have padlocks of your own that they use to send you files. It works the same in both directions.

Where your keys live: a vault with a clerk

With most OpenPGP software, your ring (your private key) is a file on a disk, locked with a passphrase. Every program that signs or decrypts needs that passphrase, so it ends up written into job scripts and settings, and anyone who gets both the file and the passphrase has your ring.

VSX OpenPGP/i keeps your rings in a vault instead: an IBM i key store, locked by the system's own master key. Your keys are made inside the vault and never come out. When a job needs to sign or decrypt, it hands the document to the vault's clerk, the operating system, which does the work inside and hands back the result. There is no passphrase to store and no key file to steal. A copy of the system's disks without the master key gives an intruder nothing usable.

The clerk keeps an access list. Who may ask for your ring to be used is your decision, key by key: these users and groups may decrypt with it, those may also sign. A brand-new key has nobody on its list until you add someone. Sending files to partners and checking their seals use only their padlocks and the impressions of their rings, so anyone allowed to run those jobs can do them.

Knowing whose padlock you're holding

A padlock is only as good as your certainty about whose it is. If someone slipped you their own padlock labelled "the bank", you'd lock the payroll file in a box only they can open.

So every partner's padlock arrives on probation. Nothing is locked with it, and seals checked against it don't count, until someone confirms its fingerprint: a long serial number, which the partner reads to you over the phone or in person. Not by the same e-mail that brought the padlock, because that is exactly what an impostor would control. It takes a minute once per partner, and it's the step everything else rests on.

A carbon copy for yourself

Once the bank's padlock is snapped shut, you can't open the box either. That's the point, but it's also awkward when an auditor asks what you sent on the 3rd. So each file can carry a second lock: one of your own padlocks, on the same box. The bank opens it with theirs, and you can open it with yours. It's on by default whenever a partner has one of your keys assigned.

Rings wear out, and rings get lost

  • Expiry. Most partners want keys that expire, often every year or two, so a stolen or forgotten key doesn't live forever. You set the date, and you move it before it arrives, then send the partner the updated impression. An expired ring still opens what was sent to you before; it just stops sealing new things.
  • Revocation. If you think a ring may have been copied, or you're retiring it, you revoke it: a signed notice telling partners to stop using it. Partners' software honours the notice once they've received it, so send it to them.
  • A notice written in advance. If the system and its master key were ever lost together, you could no longer sign a revocation notice, and partners would keep locking files with a padlock nobody can open. So, on day one, you write a revocation notice and put it in a safe. It does nothing until you send it.

What the log remembers

Every file sealed, opened, signed or checked, every key made, changed or revoked, every partner added, every change to who may use what, and every refusal is written down: who, when, which key, which partner, which file, and why it failed if it did. Where the system keeps its own security journal, each entry goes there too, so your security monitoring sees it alongside everything else.

If your license runs out

Sealing and signing new files stop. Opening and checking files never do. Your rings can't leave the vault, so no other tool could open what your partners sent you, and we won't hold your own files hostage.

The sharp edges, honestly

  • The master key is the vault door. Lose the system's master key, on the system and in your disaster-recovery plan, and every key in the vault is gone for good, along with your ability to open anything sent to you. Keep its passphrase parts with two custodians, set the same master key on your recovery system, and test the recovery once before you need it.
  • An unconfirmed padlock is a trusted stranger. Confirming a fingerprint by phone feels like a formality. It's the only thing that stands between you and an impostor.
  • Once the bank opens the box, the file is theirs to protect. OpenPGP protects the file in transit and at rest in its envelope, not after the recipient opens it.
  • What a box doesn't hide. The file's name and contents are inside the box, but its size, when it was sent, and who it was sent to are not.
  • Today's locks are RSA. OpenPGP's long-standing RSA locks, the kind every partner can use today, are expected to be retired in the next decade, as quantum computers mature: national guidance currently says phase them out after 2030 and stop using them after 2035. The OpenPGP standard's successor locks are approved, and we will follow as partners and IBM i support them.

In short

Your partners get files only they can open, sealed with a ring that never leaves your system. You decide who may use it. Every step is written down. And nothing about the product, not even an expired license, can lock you out of what was sent to you.