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How VSX DAR/i protects your data at rest

Card numbers, tax IDs, salaries and account numbers sit in your IBM i database every day, and in every backup of it. Most of the people and programs that can reach those tables have no reason to see those values, and a lost backup tape or a copied disk shouldn't give them away. VSX DAR/i, Data At Rest for IBM i, encrypts the columns that matter and the backups you make, without changing your applications. This page explains how, in plain terms, and where its limits are.

A ledger written in cipher, and a clerk who reads it aloud

Picture each sensitive column as a ledger written in cipher. On disk, and in every copy of the disk, the column holds only the cipher.

When a program asks for a row, a clerk stands between it and the ledger: the database itself. The clerk looks at who is asking, and reads the value aloud in one of four ways, decided by you, column by column:

  • Plain: the real value, for the people who need it.
  • Masked: most of it hidden, for instance all but the last four digits of a card number, for the people who only need to recognize it.
  • The cipher itself: what's on disk, for people and programs that should handle the data without being able to read it.
  • Nothing: blanks or zeros, or a refusal, for everyone else.

You set a default for each column, and change it for particular users and groups. A user's own setting counts first, then their group's, then their other groups' in order, then the column's default.

Your applications don't change. The clerk works inside the database, so every program, query tool and report sees the column the way its user is allowed to see it, without a line of code changed. Programs that write the column hand the clerk plain values, and the clerk writes the cipher.

Codes that keep their shape

Some columns have to keep looking like what they are: a 16-digit card number that other systems check, a phone number with its dashes. For those, the cipher can keep the shape of the original: digits become other digits, letters and digits become other letters and digits, and the length stays the same. It costs more processing per row than the ordinary cipher, so it's a choice per column.

Sealed crates for your backups

Your save commands write everything they save, sensitive or not, to tape, save files or the cloud. VSX DAR/i adds an encrypted version of each native save command. It saves exactly what the native command saves, compresses it, and seals it in an encrypted file. The matching restore commands open it and restore as the native ones do. A copy of the file without the key is noise.

Each crate is labelled with the name of the key that sealed it, and you can list what's inside a crate without opening it.

Where the keys live: a vault behind the system's own door

The keys that write the cipher and seal the crates are kept in an IBM i key store, protected by the system's master key, the door of the vault. They're made inside the vault and used there; no program, ours included, ever holds one in the clear. A copy of the system's disks without the master key gives an intruder no keys and no data.

Keys can also come from your company's key server, if you have one that speaks the industry standard for this (KMIP). They arrive sealed for this system, go into the vault, and from then on are used like any other. Nothing that reads or writes a column, or saves or restores a backup, talks to the key server, so a key server that's down or slow can't stop your work. If someone destroys a key on the key server, it isn't removed here until someone here confirms it, so a slip on the server can't make data unreadable by itself.

Changing keys

  • The vault door's combination (the master key) can be changed regularly, as many standards ask. The keys inside are resealed for the new combination; the data and backups don't change, and running jobs carry on.
  • A column's key can be replaced, for instance after a suspected compromise. Every row is read with the old key and written with the new one, in a maintenance window. The old key is kept, never deleted, because older backups still need it.
  • Moving a key to another system, for a recovery site or a second partition, is done sealed: it never crosses the network in the clear.

A checkup

A check you can run at any time, and on your recovery system quarterly, reports whether everything is in order: the vault and who can reach it, every key present and sealed under the current master key, every encrypted column on a working key, and the product's own setup. It names each problem, and ends with "ready" when there are none.

If your license runs out

New encrypted columns and new encrypted backups stop. Everything already encrypted keeps working: every column still reads and writes, and every backup still restores. Your data is never held hostage.

The sharp edges, honestly

  • The master key is the vault door. Lose the system's master key, on the system and in your disaster-recovery plan, and every key in the vault is gone for good, and with them every encrypted column and every encrypted backup. Keep its passphrase parts with two custodians, set the same master key on your recovery system, and test a recovery before you need one.
  • Equal values look equal. So that searches like "find this account number" keep working, the same value always becomes the same cipher. Someone who can see the stored cipher can't read the values, but can tell which rows share one. For a column with only a few different values (yes or no, a state code) that can give a lot away; we warn when you encrypt one.
  • Masked users compare masked values. A user who sees a column masked gets results from range searches ("greater than", "between") based on what they see, not on the real values. Equality searches are unaffected.
  • Every row costs a little. Writing an encrypted value takes tens of microseconds, and reading one somewhat less; the shape-keeping cipher costs several times more. For most workloads that's unnoticeable, but measure your heaviest batch jobs before and after.
  • A recovery system needs the same names. The database records which program encrypts a column and where its key store is by library, so restore the product and its data library under the same names they had.
  • Keys are kept forever, on purpose. A retired key can't be deleted while a backup might still need it. Plan for that, rather than tidying keys away.